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THE COURT OF APPEALS, 1951 TERM
cation, that no record was kept of the people who came in or went
out, that ordinarily only one employee was present to care for
over 1900 boxes in the vault, and reasoned that from this evi-
dence fair minded men could draw more than one inference. Con-
sequently, the question of negligence should have been left to the
jury.
Judge Desmond for the dissent stated that the relation be-
tween the safe deposit company and its depositor is not that of
bailor-bailee, because the safe deposit company did not have ex-
clusive possession over the contents of the box. Consequently,
the plaintiff was not entitled to the presumption of negligence.
Without the presumption, plaintiff had failed to state a cause of
action, because she had failed to show any causal connection be-
tween defendant's alleged negligence and the disappearance.
Hence, the defendant was entitled to a directed verdict.
It is submitted that the characterization of Judge Desmond,
theoretically speaking, is true. But in the light of practical re-
sults, characterizing the relation as one of bailment achieves a
just and fair solution of a unique problem. It shifts the burden
of producing evidence to the defendant. Any other characteri-
zation would compel the depositor to sue on general negligence
principles, and since there is no available legal device to permit
the shifting of the burden to the defendant the result would
ordinarily be to deny recovery.
The opinion of the majority, by declaring that the question of
negligence was for the jury, has established a precedent for sim-
ilar fact situations, and to that extent defined the standard of
care for safe deposit companies. 6
IX. ToRTs
The law of torts must effect a reasonable compromise between
conflicting interests, marking out the limits of permissible invasion
of one man's interests by another. The courts in the development
of the common law have been guided by and have often expressly
referred to, "public policy" as the final standard of justice.: Tort
law being primaily non-statutory, its growth and development
depend on the temperament of any given court. The exigency of
adhering to past rules or precedents may conflict with a just dis-
position of the case before the court. The 1951-1952 term of the
New York Court of Appeals illustrates the successful adjusting of
46. See PRossER, supra n. 37, § 41.
1. Pound, Interests in Personality, 28 H.Av. L. REv. 343 (1915).
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the current ideas of what is "public policy," on the one hand, and
the antecedent rules and precedents on the other.
A. Negligence
Duty
The philosophy of a progressive court of last instance is
demonstrated in Woods- v. Lancet.2 Rather than take the path
so often followed by referring any advance in the law to the legis-
lature, the Court, in the interest of justice, created a new duty.
The breach of -this duty will be recognized at law as actionable
negligence.
An infant plaintiff, in an action brought by his guardian ad
litem, sued for injuries sustained while plaintiff was en ventre sa
mere3 in the ninth month of pregnancy. The Court of Appeals held
that the complaint, alleging prenatal injuries tortiously inflicted on
a ninth month fetus actually born later, stated a cause of action.4
The only legal precedent in the court's way was Drobner v.
Peters,5 which denied recovery in a similar instance. In implicitly
overruling this case the court cited Rumsey v. New York c N. E. R.,0
where the Court of Appeals said that it had not only the right, but
the duty to re-examine a question where justice demands it. The
court also cited Frank v. United States,7 to the effect that while
legislative bodies have the power to change old rules of law, never-
theless, when they fail to act, it is the duty of the courts to bring
the law into accord with present day standards of wisdom and
justice, rather than with outworn and antiquated rules of the past.
The Court might well have quoted from the dissenting opinion in
the Lancet case in the Appellate Division: "The law would be an
absurd science were it founded on precedents only. The law is
presumed to keep pace with present day concepts."18
Recovery was denied in the Drobner case9 on three grounds:
(1) lack of precedent, (2) the difficulty of proof, and (3) refusal of
2. 303 N. Y. 349, 102 N. E. 2d 691 (1951), rezg 278 App. Div. 913, 105 N. Y. S.
2d 417 (Ist Dep't 1951).
3. Unborn child in utero.
4. Woods v. Lancet, sufra n. 2.
5. 232 N. Y. 220, 133 N. E. 567 (1921).
6. 133 N. Y. 79, 85, 30 N. E. 654, 655 (1892).
7. 290 U. S. 371, 382 (1933).
8. 278 App. Div. 913, 914, 105 N. Y. S. 2d 417, 418 (1st Dep't 1951)..
9. Supra n. 2.
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the law to recognize the unborn child as separate from its mother.
The New York courts have felt bound by the decision and its rea-
soning until the principal case. 10
Obviously, the least substantial argument is the lack of prece-
dent. The common law does not go on the theory that a case of
first impression presehts a legislative rather than a judicial prob-
lem." "(I)f that were a valid objection, the common law would
now be in the Plantagenet period.I"' At any rate there is ample
precedent in 6ther jurisdictions today where recovery has been
recognized."3
Similarly, the objection that proof is difficult is weak. The
proof should have no effect on the pleadings' and indeed, it is no
different than proof required in any other cause of action.
The third ground for denying recovery-that of refusal to
characterize the unborn child as an entity separate from its mother
has been disproved by medical science.' 5 Moreover, the law has
recognized property6 and personal 7 rights of an unborn child.
Once the embryo, a fortiori the fetus, is deemed a person, the duty
of care follows as a conclusion.
Thus with all three arguments properly disposed of, the court
was not bound by stare decisis and took the proper course of over-
ruling Drobner v. Peters.'8 Although the decision was carefully
limited to the fact of a viable, nine months fetus later born, the
Court may well in the future allow an action for injury to a shorter
10. Matter of Roberts, 158 Misc, 286 N. Y. Supp. 476 (Surr. Ct. 1936).
11. 1935 Report, N. Y. LAw RmsIIN CDmssioN 449, 465.
12. 4 U. of Toronto L. J. 285 (1941).
13. Bonbrest v. Kotz, 65 F. Supp. 138 (D. D. C. 1946); Scott v. McPheeters,
33 Cal. App. 2d 629, 92 P. 2d 678 (1939) ; Tucker v. Carmichael & Sons, 208 Ga. 201,65 S. E. 2d 909 (1951) ; Cooper v. Blanck, 39 So. 2d 352 (La. App. 1923) ; Damasiewiczv. Gorsuch,-Md.-, 79 A. 2d 550 (1951); Verkennes v. Corniea, 229 Minn. 365, 38N. W. 2d 838 (1949); Williams v. Marion Rapid Transit, Inc., 152 Ohio St. 114, 87N. E. 2d 334 (1949); Montreal Tramways v. Leveille, [1933] Can. S. C. 456, [1933] 4
D. L. R. 337.
14. See C. P. A. § 241.
15. "An embryo's life as a new individual must be regarded as commencing atthe moment of fertilization." Patten, Hum.x Em.IYOLOGY 181 (1946). The 'embryo,and a fortiori the fetus, has its own nervious and circulatory. system separate from itsmother. Arey, DEVEwLokzMTAL ANATomy 90-91 (4th rev. ed. 1940).
16. For cases see note, 1 Bno..-L Rnv. 19 195 (1952).
17. N. Y. PENAL LAw § 1050 imposes penalty of 'first degree manslaughter forwilfully killing the child after it is able to stir in the womb. § 1052 imposes penalty on
mother for causing the death of "the quick child whereof she is pregnant."
18. Supra n. 5.
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term fetus and finally to an embryo, and also a wrongful death
action 9 for such injury.
Standard of Care
A landowner owes a duty of reasonable care to protect
invitiees, not only against riskis incident to the former's activi-
ties, but against hazards incident to the condition of the
premises.20 The one in posses'sion of land owes the affirmative duty
to inspect his premises and either make them safe or give adequate
warning, so that an invitee may judge and see if he wishes to assume
the risk.
21
Although there is a conflict 22 among the states on the question
whether a municipal corporation in the maintenance of parks as
places of recreation is discharging a governmental duty or a quasi-
corporate one, it is settled in New York that it is the latter.
2
1
With these rules in mind, we should conclude that a munici-
pality stands on the same basis as a private land owner in regard
to the duty of care required in the operation of a park. Moreover,
there should be no need to categorize a situation as involving a
special relationship. The normal rules of negligence should apply,
and the duty should arise, not out of any anachronistic relation-
ship, but out of defendant's conduct likely to affect the interests
of the plaintiff.
In Caldwell v. ' llage of Island Park,24 the plaintiff sued the
village for negligence in permitting fireworks on a city owned
owned and operated beach after the hour when admission ceased
to be charged and supervision provided. Admission was charged
from 9:00 A. M. to 6:00 P. M.,. and from 6:00 P.M. to 11:00 P. M.
the public is admitted free, but lifeguards were not provided.
Plaintiff was injured by fireworks set-off by some third person
after 6:00 P. Al. There was evidence that on the two previous
days people had complained of fireworks to the lifeguards. The
court held (4-3) that the village owed a duty to the plaintiff and
was negligent in so far as the plaintiff was injured by the third
person's setting off fireworks.
19. DECEDE-NT ESTATE LAW § 130.
20. Mappv. Saenger Theaters, Inc., 40 F. 2d 19 (5th Cir. 1930).
21. Haefeli v. Wdodrich Engineering Co., 255 N. Y. 442, 175 N. E. 123 (1931).
22. See Augustine v. Town of Brant, 249 N. Y. 198, 163 N. E. 732 (1928).
23. Collentine v. City of New York, 279 N. Y. 119, 17 N. E. 2d 792 (1938);
Ehrgott v. New York. 96 N. Y. 264 (1884).
24. 304 N. Y. 268, 107 N. E. 2d 441 (1952y, revfg 279 App. Div. 746, 108 N. Y. S.
2d 334 (2d Dep't 1951).
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